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A new (and questionable) institute to guarantee the right of 
access to the high seas: the Junction Area established in 
Croatian territorial sea  
di Marcella Ferri 
Abstract: Un nuovo (e discutibile) istituto volto a garantire il diritto di accesso 
all’alto mare: la Junction Area creata nel mare territoriale croato – This paper analyses 
the Junction Area created by the Arbitral Tribunal which, in June 2017, released its Final 
Award on the territorial and maritime dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. Although the 
Area is established in Croatian territorial sea, all ships and aircraft passing through this zone 
to go to or come from Slovenia, enjoy some freedoms of communications which are 
«exercisable as if they were high seas freedoms exercisable in an exclusive economic zone». 
Firstly, this Junction Area is analysed as an institute aiming to guarantee Slovenia’s right of 
access to and from the high seas: it represents a crucial innovation within the regime of 
states, such as land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states, having a limited access 
to the sea, and it might have some meaningful consequences in their future discipline. 
Secondly, the comparison between the Junction Area and other institutes of the international 
law of the sea consents to point out some shortcomings of the zone created by the Arbitral 
Tribunal. As the discipline of the exclusive economic zone represents the main element 
characterising the regime of this Area, the freedoms of communication recognised within 
this zone go significantly beyond what is strictly necessary to assure communication 
between Slovenia’s territorial waters and the high seas, and this results in some meaningful 
restrictions on Croatia’s sovereignty. 
Keywords: Right of access to and from the sea; Geographically disadvantaged States; High 
seas corridors; Junction Area; Croatia v. Slovenia arbitration. 
1. Introduction 
On 29 June 2017, an Arbitral Tribunal released its Final Award on the 
territorial and maritime dispute between Croatia and Slovenia, putting an end to 
a long-lasting controversy which started after the dissolution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.1 The questions at issue concern two different 
                                                                 
1 Croatia v. Slovenia, PCA Case Repository 2012-04, Final Award, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 29 June 
2017). For an historical background of the dispute see, among others, G. H. Blake, D. 
Topalović (eds.), The Maritime Boundaries of the Adriatic Sea, 1 Maritime Briefing 8, 1996, 19 
ff., available at www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/download/?id=231; M. Avbelj, L. C. 
Jernej, The Conundrum of the Piran Bay: Slovenia v. Croatia - The Case of Maritime Delimitation, 
in 5 The University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law and Policy 2, 2007, 1-19, 
available at ssrn.com/abstract=990183; T. Scovazzi, Recent Developments as Regards Maritime 
Delimitation in The Adriatic Sea, in R. Lagoni, D. Vignes (eds.), Maritime Delimitation, Leiden, 
2006, 197; V. Sancin, Slovenia-Croatia Border Dispute: From »Drnovšek-Račan« to »Pahor-
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aspects: the maritime and land boundary between Croatia and Slovenia, and in 
particular the status of the Bay of Piran, and the establishment of a Junction 
Area aiming to assure Slovenia’s right of access to and from the high seas. After 
several useless attempts to solve the controversy, in November 2009, the parties 
signed an Arbitration Agreement under the auspices of the European Union. 
According to Article 3 of the Agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal was tasked with 
defining a) the land and maritime boundary between Croatia and Slovenia, b) 
Slovenia’s junction to the high seas, and c) the regime for the use of the relevant 
maritime areas. The Tribunal was requested to decide the first question 
according to the «rules and the principles of international law»; instead, the 
second and third aspects had to be determined by applying «international law, 
equity and the principle of good neighbourly relations in order to achieve a fair 
and just result».2  
The controversial resolution was particularly troubled because in July 
2015 Serbian and Croatian newspapers reported the transcriptions of two 
telephone conversations between Dr. Sekolec, the arbitrator appointed by 
Slovenia, and Ms. Drenik, one of the Slovenian agents before the Tribunal; these 
conversations aimed to disclose some confidential information and discuss the 
best strategy to influence the other arbitrators in favour of Slovenia. Following 
the reported ex parte communications, both Dr. Sekolec and Ms. Drenik resigned, 
and Slovenia was invited to appoint another arbitrator. Unsurprisingly, this 
event has significantly affected the proceedings: in July 2015, Croatia declared 
that, following the violation of the Arbitral Agreement committed by Slovenia, it 
would cease to apply the Agreement and take part in the proceedings. Due to 
Slovenia’s objection, the recomposed Tribunal had to decide whether Croatia was 
entitled to terminate the Arbitration Agreement, in accordance with Article 60, 
para. 1, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. On 30 June 2016, the 
Tribunal released a Partial Award and stated that, although Slovenia breached 
the Arbitration Agreement, this violation did not defeat the object and purpose 
of the Agreement, and so it would not «render[ed] the continuation of the 
proceedings impossible» under Article 60, para. 1, of the Vienna Convention.3 
Indeed, according to the Tribunal, there were not any doubt about the 
independence and impartiality of the recomposed Tribunal; moreover, this latter 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Kosor« Agreement, in 2 European Perspectives 2, 2010, 93-111; T. Bickl, Reconstructing the 
Intractable: The Croatia-Slovenia Border Dispute and Its Implications for EU Enlargement, in 54 
Croatian Political Science Review, 4, 2017, 7-39, see in particular 11 ff.  
2 See Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 4 November 2009, Articles 3 and 4; available at 
pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2165.  
3 As regards the independence and impartiality of arbitrators see, inter alia, F. Bestagno, 
Diritti, doveri e responsabilità degli arbitri in C. Consolo, L. G. Radicati di Brozolo, M. V. 
Benedettelli, Commentario breve al diritto dell'arbitrato nazionale ed internazionale, Padova, 
2010, 751-758; S. D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators in 12 ILSA Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 2, 2005-2006, 499-521; Y. Tanaka, The Peaceful Settlement 
of International Disputes, Cambridge, 2018, 105 ff.; some specific references to the breach of 
independence and impartiality in the arbitration between Slovenia and Croatia can be found 
at 112.  
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carefully reviewed its records, and communicated to the parties the only 
documents previously submitted to the Tribunal by Dr. Sekolec in collaboration 
with Ms. Drenik.4 Despite this decision, Croatia continued not to take part in the 
proceedings and has not implemented the Final Award of June 2017. This paper 
will not discuss the rejection of an Arbitral Award by one of the parties,5 but it 
will be focused on the substance of the decision, and in particular on the regime 
established by the Tribunal in the Junction Area.  
Unlike the delimitation of land and maritime boundaries and the 
qualification of the Bay of Piran, in relation to which the Tribunal applied the 
traditional criteria elaborated in international case-law on land and maritime 
controversies,6 the establishment of the Junction Area puts forward some new 
and interesting aspects.7 The meaningful side of the Award lies in two different 
elements. First, the institute of the Junction Area which, while having some 
features in common with other institutes of the international law of the sea, 
represents quite a unicum, and indeed it is characterised by a sui generis regime. 
Second, the freedoms of communication recognised to vessels and aircraft 
passing through the Area to go to or come from Slovenia; these freedoms aim to 
assure the effectiveness of the right to access to and from the high seas and their 
recognition can have some meaningful implications for the never-ending issue of 
states having limited or no access to the sea.8 In the light of this, the analysis of 
                                                                 
4 Croatia v. Slovenia, PCA Case Repository 2012-04, Partial Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 30 June 
2016). As regards this Award, cf. among others, M. Ilić, Croatia v. Slovenia: the Defiled 
Proceedings, in 9 Arbitration Law Review 347, 2017, available at 
elibrary.law.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview/vol9/iss1/11/.  
5 As for the compliance with arbitral decisions see, inter alia, A. Huneeus, Compliance with 
International Court Judgments and Decisions, in C. Romano, K. Alter, Y. Shany (eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of International Adjudication, Oxford, 2014, 437-463; S. Rosenne, Interpretation, 
Revision and Other Recourse from International Judgments and Awards, Leiden, Boston, 2007; H. 
D. Phan, L. Nguyen, The South China Sea Arbitration: Bindingness, Finality, and Compliance 
with UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Decisions, in 8 Asian Journal of International Law 1, 2018, 36-
50; S. Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitration and the Finality of ‘Final’ Awards, in 8 Journal 
of International Dispute Settlement 2, 2017, 388-401.  
6 For a comment about these issues, see, M. Avbelj, J. Letnar Cernic, cit.; T. Bickl, cit. As 
regards the delimitation of maritime boundaries in international case-law see, inter alia, E. 
Orihuela Calatayud, La delimitación de espacios marinos entre Estados y la jurisprudencia 
internacional in Cursos de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales de Vitoria-
Gasteiz/Vitoria-Gasteizko Nazioarteko Zuzenbidearen eta Nazioarteko Harremanen Ikastaroak, 
2017, 487-574; S. Fietta, R. Cleverly, A Practitioner’s Guide to Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 
Oxford, 2016; A. G. Oude Elferink, T. Henriksen, S. V. Busch, Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation: The Case Law: Is It Consistent and Predictable?, Cambridge, 2018; J. Shi, Maritime 
Delimitation in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, in 9 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 2, 2010, 271-291; D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, The International Law of the 
Sea, Oxford, Portland, 2010, 483 ff.  
7 Cf. A. Solomou, A Commentary on the Maritime Delimitation Issues in the Croatia v. Slovenia 
Final Award, in EJIL: Talk!, 15 September 2017, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/a-
commentary-on-the-maritime-delimitation-issues-in-the-croatia-v-slovenia-final-award/; 
according to the Author, the establishment of the Junction Area represents «by far the most 
interesting aspect of the final award for law of the sea enthusiasts».  
8 In this regard, see International Court of Justice, Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific 
Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile); the judgement of the Court is expected for 1 October 2018.  
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the arbitral decision continues to be interesting, although the dispute between 
Slovenia and Croatia seems far from being resolved: indeed, after Croatia’s 
declaration not to accept the arbitration Award, in March 2018 Slovenia initiated 
proceedings against Croatia under Article 259 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union.9 
Firstly, the paper will describe the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on the 
Junction Area; secondly this Area will be analysed in the framework of the right 
of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states to access to the sea, and 
the added value of the Award in relation to this issue will be emphasised. 
Thirdly, the paper will discuss the sui generis regime of the Junction Area, 
pointing out its double nature: the focus on the management of living resources 
and fishing activities in the Area will consent to stress some difficulties 
characterising the practical implementation of the regime defined by the Arbitral 
Tribunal in this zone. Finally, the analysis will highlight the differences between 
the Junction Area and other institutes of international law of the sea, such as 
high seas corridors and straits used for international navigation. In particular, 
the analysis will pay a great of attention to the specificities of the transit passage 
which assures the non-suspendable and expeditious transit through international 
straits. By discussing enforcement powers of Croatia as regards the carrying out 
of foreign military activities and the environmental protection within the 
Junction Area, this paper will try to demonstrate that the adoption of the transit 
passage regime, along with some correctives, would have led to find a fairer 
balance between Slovenian and Croatian interests.  
2. The identification of a Junction Area between Slovenia’s territorial sea 
and the high seas 
The connection between Slovenia and the high seas is assured by establishing a 
Junction Area of 2.5 nautical miles which is located in Croatia’s territorial sea. It 
stretches from the outer limit of Croatia’s territorial sea on one side, and the 
maritime boundary between Slovenia and Croatia as defined by the Award on the 
other side; in the longitudinal direction, the Area is adjacent to the boundary 
between Italy and Croatia as established by the Treaty of Osimo.10  While being 
an area of Croatia’s territorial sea, the Junction Area is subject to a «special legal 
regime»11 specified by the Tribunal in its Award. Its main and essential feature is 
represented by the freedoms of communication which must be assured «for the 
purposes of uninterrupted and uninterruptible access to and from Slovenia, including its 
territorial sea and its airspace».12 Since this affirmation, the regime defined by 
the Tribunal for the Junction Area appears to be characterised by a functional 
                                                                 
9 Cf. Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Arbitration, available at 
www.vlada.si/en/projects/arbitration/; Republic of Slovenia, Ministry on Foreign Affairs, 
Oral Hearing on Violations of EU Law due to Croatia’s Refusal to Accept the Arbitration Award, 2 
May 2018, available at: www.mzz.gov.si/en/newsroom/news/39787/.  
10 Cf. Croatia v. Slovenia, Final Award, cit., Map. VII, 347.  
11 Ibi, para. 1081.  
12 Ibi, para. 1123 (emphasis added).  
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vocation: the freedoms recognised in favour of Slovenia in this body of water are 
functional at implementing Slovenia’s right of access to and from the high seas, 
and at assuring its effectiveness. From a subjective point of view, the freedoms of 
communication do not only cover Slovenian ships and aircraft, but all vessels and 
aircraft - both civil and military - which, regardless of their nationality, go to or 
come from Slovenia’s territorial sea.  
The regime of the Junction Area lies in a couple of different, while 
interconnected, elements: the freedoms of communication as such (paras. 1123-
1128 Award), and a set of aspects aiming to assure the effectiveness of these 
freedoms («Guarantees of, and Limitations to, the Freedoms of Communication», 
paras. 1129-1133 Award); as it will be underlined below, these elements 
ultimately imply some meaningful limitations on the exercise of Croatia’s 
jurisdiction upon its territorial sea, and in particular upon ships and aircraft 
passing through the Area. As for the first element characterising the regime 
created by the Tribunal, namely the freedoms of communication as such, they 
include  
«freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine 
cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related 
to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, 
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines» (para. 1123). 
However, these freedoms do not cover the exploitation of biological and 
mineral resources within the Area, the establishment and the use of artificial 
islands and the carrying out of marine scientific research: these prerogatives are 
implicitly left to Croatia.13  
The Tribunal is clear in specifying that the freedoms of communication do 
not coincide with the innocent passage. The differences, identified by the Award 
in paragraph 1127, can be classified into two categories. One group covers the 
nature of the passage which implies first, that the passage through the Junction 
Area does not need to comply with the criteria of innocence defined by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as regards the 
innocent passage and second, the absence of submarines’ duty to navigate on 
surface. The second group pertains the limitations placed on controls exercisable 
by Croatia on the freedoms of communication: these freedoms are not 
suspendable by Croatia «under any circumstances», and more generally, cannot 
be subject by Croatia to «any controls or requirements» (para. 1127) beyond 
those established by UNCLOS in relation to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 
Finally, the Tribunal specifies that the freedoms recognised in the Junction Area 
are different from the transit passage which characterises the regime of straits 
used for international navigation. Nevertheless, unlike the difference with the 
                                                                 
13 Ibi, para. 1126: «The freedoms of communication in the Junction Area do not include the 
freedom to explore, exploit, conserve or manage the natural resources, whether living or 
non-living, of the waters or the seabed or the subsoil in the Junction Area. Nor do they 
include the right to establish and use artificial islands, installations or structures, or the 
right to engage in marine scientific research, or the right to take measures for the protection 
or preservation of the marine environment».  
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innocent passage, the difference between the freedoms of communication and the 
transit passage is not specified by the Tribunal; it merely states:  
«Unlike transit passage, the freedoms of communication in the Junction 
Area are exercisable as if they were high sea freedoms exercisable in an 
exclusive economic zone» (para. 1128).  
With regard to the second element characterising the regime of the 
Junction Area, namely the aspects assuring the effectiveness of the freedoms of 
communication, they concern the extent of jurisdiction Croatia is entitled to 
exercise in the Area in question. The analysis of the Award shows that Croatia’s 
jurisdiction is subject to numerous and meaningful limitations aiming to 
implement the freedoms of communication. As for the prescriptive jurisdiction, 
the Tribunal explicitly clarifies that:  
«it fair, just, and practical for Croatia to remain entitled to adopt laws and regulations 
applicable to non-Croatian ships and aircraft in the Junction Area, giving effect to the generally 
accepted international standards in accordance with UNCLOS Article 39(2) and (3)» (para. 1130).   
Certainly, the enforcement jurisdiction suffers more meaningful 
limitations. Indeed, according to the Award:  
«it is necessary that ships and aircraft of all flags and of all kinds, civil and 
military, exercising the freedom of communication are not subject to 
boarding, arrest, detention, diversion or any other form of interference by 
Croatia while in the Junction Area» (para. 1129).  
As specified by the Tribunal, this aspect does not affect Croatia’s right to 
exercise its enforcement jurisdiction «outside the Junction Area» and «in all 
other areas of its territorial sea and other maritime zones»; and this also implies 
the right to prosecute violations of law committed in the Area. Nevertheless, it is 
evident that paragraph 1129 places a great and exceptional limitation on 
Croatia’s jurisdiction: ships and aircraft exercising the freedoms of 
communication within the Area enjoy a real immunity towards a fundamental 
element of Croatia’s sovereignty, namely its enforcement jurisdiction.  
3. Freedoms of communication in the framework of the right of access to 
and from the sea 
As clearly affirmed by the Tribunal, the Junction Area regime aims to assure 
Slovenia’s right of access to and from the high seas. Against this background, the 
freedoms of communication recognised in this Area can be analysed in the 
framework of the right of access to and from the sea. In this regard, it can be 
useful to retrace this issue which is at the heart of claims submitted by land-
locked and geographically disadvantaged states. While during the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, they converged their interests and 
joined their negotiating efforts, they represent two different categories of states, 
not only from a definitional (and geographical) point of view, but also in the light 
of different set of rights recognised them by UNCLOS.   
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3.1. The land-locked states’ right of access to and from the sea 
The definition of land-locked states does not arise particular problems. Article 
124, para. 1, UNCLOS formalises the traditional notion, according to which 
land-locked states are states not having «sea-coast». Due to their location, they 
do not have a direct access to and from the sea but depend upon the chance to 
pass through one or more transit states.14 As underlined by several Authors, the 
category of land-locked states gathers states having different features, especially 
from the economic point of view; the only element they share is the lack of direct 
access to the sea.15 The origin of the right to access to the sea traces back to 
natural law. The access to the sea represents an element of the wider question of 
transit of persons, commodities and means of transportation: according to 
principles of natural law defined by Grotius and de Vattel, the right of transit 
across foreign territories «remain[s] to all nations».16 More recently, several 
Authors have justified the right of access to the sea as the necessary element 
assuring the effectiveness of the freedoms of the high seas17 or as the object of an 
international servitude.18   
As historically the right of access to the sea was an element of the freedom 
of transit and for many centuries rivers represented the main transport route, the 
necessity to assure access to the sea has started to be recognised by bilateral and 
multilateral agreements assuring freedoms of navigation of international 
                                                                 
14 A transit state is defined by Article 124.1(b) UNCLOS as «a state, with or without a sea-
coast, situated between a land-locked state and the sea, through whose territory traffic in 
transit passes». The strategic position of transit states and the role they can play to 
condition the chance of land-locked states to have access to the sea are widely stressed by A. 
Mpazi Sinjela, Freedom of Transit and the Right of Access for Land-Locked States: The Evolution 
of Principle and Law, in 12 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 31, 1982, 31-
32.  
15 S.C. Vasciannie, Land-locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States in the International 
Law of the Sea, Oxford, 1990, 4 ff.; J. L. Kateka, Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged 
States, in D. Attard, M. Fitzmaurice, N. A. Martinez Gutiérrez (eds.), The IMLI Manual on 
International Maritime Law. Volume I: The Law of the Sea, Oxford, 2014, 431-441.  
16 E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux 
affaires des Nations et des Souverains, Londres, 1758, 149. Similarly, H. Grotius, De iure belli ac 
pacis, Paris, 1625.  
17 Cf. A. Mpazi Sinjela, cit., 32; N. J.G. Pounds, A Free and Secure Access to the Sea, in 49 The 
Annals of the American Association of Geographers 3, 1959, 257; M. Sibert, Traité de Droit 
International Public, Vol. 1, Paris, 1956, 660; G. Scelles, Manuel de Droit International Public, 
Paris, 1964, 382; according to the Author: «the high seas - a public international domain - 
comes only under the jurisdiction of international law. The sea - res communis - is for the 
common use of all navigators of the international community. One of the consequences is 
that it is accessible for navigation, even for nationals of an enclave state». For a 
comprehensive description of different theories elaborated by Authors to justify the right of 
access to the sea, cf. K. Uprety, The Transit Regime for Landlocked States: International Law 
and Development Perspectives, Law, justice, and development series, Washington DC, 2006, 28 
ff.  
18 P. Labrousse, Des Servitudes en Droit International, Bordeaux, 1911, p. 316 ; G. Scelles, cit., 
389. As regards international servitudes, cf. among others, P. B. Potter, The Doctrine of 
Servitudes in International Law, in 9 The American Journal of International Law 3, 1915, 627-
641; S. Marchisio, Servitudes, in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
Heidelberg, 2012.  
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rivers.19 The freedom of transit emerged as an international issue in the 
aftermath of the First World War: in 1919 it found a significant recognition both 
by Versailles Treaty20 and the Covenant of the League of Nations.21 These 
references paved the way for the adoption of some Treaties which, while being 
affected by significant shortcomings, gave a meaningful recognition to the 
freedom of transit. In this regard, it is necessary to recall the Barcelona 
Convention and its Statute on the Freedom of Transit (1921)22, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947)23, and the New York Convention on the 
Transit Trade of Land-Locked States (1965).24 By confirming the approach 
defined by the earlier instruments, this latter Convention recognises a transit 
regime which, on the one hand, must be free and non-discriminatory, but on the 
other, is based on a principle of reciprocity and is defined in its concrete 
modalities by agreements between land-locked states and transit states. Like the 
Barcelona Convention, the New York Convention aims to guarantee the 
legitimate interests of transit states by empowering them both to restrict the 
freedom of transit on grounds of public health, security, and protection of 
                                                                 
19 As regards the recognition of freedom of river navigation, cf. K. Uprety, cit., 37 ff.  
20 Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919), Part. XII; see in particular Article 321: «Germany 
undertakes to grant freedom of transit through her territories on the routes most convenient 
for international transit, either by rail, navigable waterway, or canal, to persons, goods, 
vessels, carriages, wagons and mails coming from or going to the territories of any of the 
Allied and Associated Powers (whether contiguous or not); for this purpose the crossing of 
territorial waters shall be allowed. Such persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and 
mails shall not be subjected to any transit duty or to any undue delays or restrictions, and 
shall be entitled in Germany to national treatment as regards charges, facilities, and all 
other matters».  
21 Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), Article 23(e): «Subject to and in accordance 
with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the 
Members of the League […] will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of 
communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of 
the League».  
22 According to Article 2 of the Statute on Freedom of Transit, the states party to the 
Convention «shall facilitate free transit by rail or waterway on routes in use convenient for 
international transit». For a more detailed description of the Barcelona Convention, cf. K. 
Uprety, cit., 48 ff.; A. Mpazi Sinjela, cit., 35 ff.  
23 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), Article 5: «Freedom of Transit. 1. Goods 
(including baggage), and also vessels and other means of transport, shall be deemed to be in 
transit across the territory of a contracting party when the passage across such territory, 
with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of 
transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the 
frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the traffic passes. Traffic of this 
nature is termed in this article “traffic in transit”. 2. There shall be freedom of transit 
through the territory of each contracting party, via the routes most convenient for 
international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting 
parties. No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin, 
departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of 
goods, of vessels or of other means of transport». An identical provision is enshrined in 
Article 5 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994).  
24 It must be also recalled the Charter adopted in Havana in 1945 by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development; the Charter, which never entered into force, 
included a provision (Article 33) identical to Article 5 of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade.  
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intellectual property (Article 11) and to temporarily suspend it in case of 
emergency (Article 12).25 Despite these prerogatives recognised to transit states 
and the low rate of ratification, the New York Convention had the merit to go 
beyond its predecessors: unlike the previous treaties, it does not cover the 
freedom of transit in general, but specifically deals with the transit of land-locked 
states and, indeed, in its Preamble it explicitly recognises the «right of each land-
locked state of free access to the sea» (Principle I).26  
This explicit reference to access to the sea is not surprising as before the 
New York Convention, in 1958 the Geneva Convention on the high seas was 
adopted. The Fifth Committee of the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 
was characterised by a «passionate confrontation»27 on the right of access to the 
sea: on the one side, land-locked states contented that their access to the sea was 
not a mere favour depending on transit states’ will, but a real right recognised as 
a principle of international law; on the other side, transit states argued that the 
right of access to the sea was subordinate to the sovereignty of coastal states.28 
In the end, the Conference came to reach consensus on the provision which 
would become the Article 3 of the Geneva Convention: this represents the first 
multilateral agreement recognising to land-locked states the freedom of access to 
the sea «in order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal terms with coastal 
states».29 Nevertheless, this recognition was more moral than actual and ended 
up privileging transit states.30 The freedom of access to the sea is not qualified as 
                                                                 
25 The New York Convention recognises the interests of transit states in a more significant 
way than the Barcelona Convention: indeed, beginning with the Preamble, the New York 
Convention states that «The state of transit, while maintaining full sovereignty over its 
territory, shall have right to take all indispensable measures to ensure that the exercise of 
the right of free and unrestricted transit shall in no way infringe its legitimate interests of 
any kind» (Principle V).  
26 K. Uprety, cit., 75: «even though it has a few weak elements as a result of the 
intransigence of transit states, the New York Convention does attempt to deal specifically 
with the transit problems of states deprived of access to the sea». For a more comprehensive 
illustration of the New York Convention, cf. K. Uprety, cit., 66 ff.; A. Mpazi Sinjela, cit., 40 
ff.; S. C. Vasciannie, cit., 186-7.  
27 K. Uprety, cit., 63.  
28 For a detailed description of the debate arisen in the Fifth Committee, Ibi, 63 ff. 
29 Convention on the high seas (1958), Article 3: «In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas 
on equal terms with coastal states, states having no sea-coast should have free access to the 
sea. To this end states situated between the sea and a state having no sea-coast shall have by 
common agreement with the latter and in conformity with existing international 
conventions accord: (a) To the state having no sea-coast, on a basis of reciprocity, free 
transit through their territory; and (b) To ships flying the flag of that state treatment equal 
to that accorded to their own ships, or to the ships of any other states, as regards access to 
seaports and the use of such ports. 2. States situated between the sea and a state having no 
sea-coast shall settle, by mutual agreement with the latter, and taking into account the 
rights of the coastal state or state of transit and the special conditions of the state having no 
sea-coast, all matters relating to freedom of transit and equal treatment in ports, in case such 
states are not already parties to existing international conventions».  
30 S. C. Vasciannie, cit., 186: «Article 3 was the first multilateral treaty provision to highlight 
the position of a single class of countries in respect of transit, and as such, it represented a 
notable moral victory for the land-locked states. Nevertheless, […] Article 3 fell short of 
their basic aspirations».  
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a right – and in this regard, it is possible to grasp the added value of the New 
York Convention –; it is a mere «faculty» or «possibility»31 the recognition of 
which depends upon an agreement between land-locked states and transit states, 
and which is assured on a reciprocal basis. The lack of normative language 
(«should have free access to the sea»), along with the no provision of obligations 
for transit states, give the impression that Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, 
while recognising the freedom of access to the sea, it is not able to assure its 
prescriptive nature.  
The confrontation between land-locked states and transit states as regards 
the possibility to qualify the right of access to the sea as a principle of 
international law was at the centre of negotiation during the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, too.32 During the negotiation, land-locked 
states were backed by geographically disadvantaged states: these two groups of 
states joined their forces formalising their claims in the Kampala Declaration.33 
The Declaration recognises that both land-locked and geographically 
disadvantaged states have «the right to free and unrestricted access to and from 
the sea as one of the cardinal rights recognised by international law»,34 and the 
right to exploit the resources of the sea in areas beyond the territorial sea.35 The 
whole Part X UNCLOS is devoted to land-locked states: their status is based 
upon the recognition of the right of access to and from the sea (Article 125.1). 
This right is necessary to assure the effectiveness of the rights secured by the 
Convention, and in particular freedoms of the high seas.36 Against this 
background, the exercise of the right of access to and from the sea supposes the 
right to transit through the territory of transit states. While Article 125, para. 1, 
explicitly recognises to land-locked states the right of access to and from the sea, 
along with the right to transit, paragraph 2 clarifies that these rights are not 
automatically recognised: indeed, the concrete terms and modalities of the right 
to transit must be defined by specific agreements between land-locked states and 
the states concerned. Through this provision, UNCLOS strikes a balance 
between the recognition of land-locked states’ right of access to and from the sea 
and the protection of transit states’ sovereignty.37 As for the recognition of the 
                                                                 
31 K. Uprety, cit., 66.  
32 Ibi, 79 ff. As regards the negotiation during the Third UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, see more generally B. H. Oxman, The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 
Seventh Session (1978), in 73 American Journal of International Law 1, 1979, 1-41; R.-J. Dupuy, 
D. Vignes, A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, Dordrecht, 1991.  
33 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume 
III (Documents of the Conference, First and Second Sessions), The Kampala Declaration, 
1974, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/23.  
34 Ibi, paras. 1-2.  
35 Ibi, para. 8.  
36 UNCLOS, Article 125.1: «Land-locked states shall have the right of access to and from 
the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in this Convention including 
those relating to the freedom of the high seas and the common heritage of mankind. To this 
end, land-locked states shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit states 
by all means of transport».  
37 The protection of transit states’ sovereignty emerges also from Article 125.3 which 
recognises to these states «right to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights and 
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right to access to the sea and freedom of transit, it can be affirmed that 
UNCLOS, with the great exception of the principle of reciprocity, does not go 
beyond its predecessors.38 
The opinions about the status recognised to land-locked states by 
UNCLOS are different both among states and commentators.39 As argued by 
some Authors, the freedoms of the high seas and the principle of equality of 
states entail that land-locked states must be entitled to a free access to the sea: 
indeed, the non-recognition of this latter would compromise the effectiveness of 
the two former principles.40 Yet, the practice does not allow to affirm the 
existence of a principle of customary law recognising to land-locked states a 
right to access to the sea.41 
3.2. The right of geographically disadvantaged states to access to living 
resources 
Geographically disadvantaged states are specifically defined42 by the UNCLOS 
as 
«coastal states, including states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, 
whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation 
of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of other states in the 
subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional 
purposes of their populations or parts thereof, and coastal states which can 
claim no exclusive economic zones of their own» (Article 70.2).   
The rights of geographically disadvantaged states are specifically 
recognised by UNCLOS in its Part V ruling the management of living resources 
in the EEZ. The EEZ system is based upon the recognition of coastal state’s 
sovereign rights on living resources. This principle, sanctioned by Article 56, 
para. 1(a), is specified by the following provisions according to which a coastal 
state must determine its capacity to harvest the living resources in its EEZ, and 
if it is not able to harvest the entire allowable catch, it must assure to other 
states to have access to the surplus of the allowable catch, taking into particular 
account the rights of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states 
                                                                                                                                                                               
facilities provided for in this Part for land-locked states shall in no way infringe their 
legitimate interests».  
38 K. Uprety, cit., 93 ff.; according to the Author, land-locked states «went through a long 
and difficult period of negotiation merely for a renewal of previously recognized rights» 
(95). 
39 In this regard, cf. J. Symonides, Geographically Disadvantaged States under the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Academy of International Law, Recueil des Courses, 208, 
Leiden, Boston, 1988, 380 ff.; K. Uprety, cit., 93 ff.  
40 Cf. K. Uprety, cit., 30-31.  
41 In this sense D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, cit., 196.  
42 As for the definition of geographically disadvantaged states, cf. J. Symonides, cit., 293 ff.; 
S. C. Vasciannie, cit., 7 ff.; L. Caflisch, What is a geographically disadvantaged state?, in 87 Ocean 
development and international law 6, 1987, 641-663.  
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(Article 62).43 UNCLOS recognises the right of land-locked (Article 69) and 
geographically disadvantaged states (Article 70)  
«to participate, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate 
part of the surplus of the living resources of the EEZs of coastal states of 
the same subregion or region».  
Like the right of access to the high seas, the “right” to participate in the 
exploitation of exceeding living resources is regulated by bilateral, sub-regional 
or regional agreements: in other words, it is not automatically recognised, but it 
depends on coastal states’ will.  
With specific regard to the position assured to geographically 
disadvantaged states by UNCLOS, the Convention has certainly the merit of 
recognising the specific condition of this category of states. Nevertheless, it must 
be pointed out that the position granted in their favour is less meaningful 
compared to the status assured to land-locked states. Indeed, the interests of 
geographically disadvantaged states are only recognised as regards the access to 
living resources; instead, unlike the land-locked states, the UNCLOS does not 
assure any recognition to the right of geographically disadvantaged states to 
access to and from the sea.  
3.3. The added value of the Arbitral Award as regards the interests of 
geographically disadvantaged states  
After analysing the rights traditionally recognised to geographically 
disadvantaged and land-locked states, it is interesting to point out how the 
Arbitral decision between Slovenia and Croatia innovates this issue, by adding 
some new elements of consideration. In this regard, it must be remarked that in 
its 1993 Memorandum on the Bay of Piran, Slovenia claimed to be a 
geographically disadvantaged state because its geographical position prevents it 
from declaring an EEZ.44 The Tribunal does not qualify Slovenia as a 
geographically disadvantaged state and does not identify this aspect as a 
foundational element of its decision. Nevertheless, when it recalls «the vital 
interests of the Parties» as one of the elements which must be taken into account 
to «to reach “a fair and just result”» (para. 1079), it makes also reference to 
Slovenia’s right of access to and from the high seas. In order words, the 
combined provisions of paragraphs 1079 and 1080 consent to affirm that this 
right is – implicitly – qualified by the Tribunal as a “vital interest”.45 This fact 
                                                                 
43 See also Article 61 ruling the conservation and management measures coastal states are 
requested to adopt.  
44 Memorandum on the Bay of Piran, Ljubljana, 7 April 1993, 5, Annex SI-272: «The 
Republic of Slovenia undoubtedly meets the requirements for the application of this 
institute, since it belongs to the group of the so-called geographically disadvantaged states 
which, due to their geographic position, cannot declare their exclusive economic zone».  
45 Recalling the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal affirms that the achievement of «a fair 
and just result» requires to take into account «all relevant circumstances», and this notion 
includes «the vital interests of the Parties» (para. 1079); in paragraph 1180 it recalls that 
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makes it interesting to analyse the Award in the framework of the land-locked 
and geographically disadvantaged states positions: in this regard, the Award’s 
contribution lies in two different elements.  
First, the innovative character of the Award lies in the recognition made 
with regard to the interests of geographically disadvantaged states. As 
underlined above, the right of access to and from the sea is only recognised by 
UNCLOS in favour of land-locked states. This right is not secured to 
geographically disadvantaged states, in relation to which the Convention 
guarantees no more than the participation in the exploitation of living resources. 
In this regard, the Award goes significantly beyond the UNCLOS as it 
acknowledges that access to the high seas can be a critical issue not only for 
land-locked states, but also for geographically disadvantaged states46: indeed, 
Slovenia’s right of access to and from the high seas is qualified as «a vital 
interest[s]».  
Second, as highlighted above, the qualification of the right to access to the 
sea as a principle of customary law is highly debated by commentators and, 
although with some exceptions, most of the Authors deny this possibility.47 The 
Award between Slovenia and Croatia confirms this thesis: indeed, the Tribunal 
does not recall the existence of a supposed principle of customary law to argue 
the necessity to recognise the freedoms of communication between Slovenia and 
the high seas.48 In this regard, it is necessary to specify that on the one side, it is 
really difficult to affirm the existence of a principle of customary law recognising 
the right of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states to access to the 
sea: indeed, this norm would imply the enforceable obligation of coastal and 
transit states to assure the implementation of this right. On the other side, the 
high number of ratifications of UNCLOS, along with the numerous bilateral and 
multilateral treaties ruling the freedom of transit, allow to sustain the existence 
of a principle of customary international law recognising the legitimate interest of 
land-locked states to have access to the sea as a necessary corollary of the 
freedoms of the high seas. Certainly, this interest cannot be qualified as an 
enforceable right, but it must be mitigated with legitimate interests of transit 
states. The Arbitral decision in Croatia v. Slovenia case is really meaningful in 
this regard. It qualifies Slovenia’s access to the high seas as a vital interest, and in 
doing so it proves the general recognition of this interest by international law; at 
the same time, the Tribunal does not qualify even this interest as a principle of 
customary law.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
«The Tribunal has taken into account all the “relevant circumstances” submitted by the 
Parties, and has noted in particular the importance attached by both Parties to the question 
of rights of access to and from Slovenia by sea and by air, and of the exercise of jurisdiction 
over ships and aircraft exercising that right, viewed in the context of the geography of the 
northern Adriatic Sea».  
46 As recalled above, this aspect was already recognised by the Kampala Declaration.  
47 See in particular the detailed analysis made by S. C., Vasciannie, cit., 197 ff.  
48 For a similar position, cf. International Court of Justice, Right of Passage over Indian 
Territory (Portugal v India), Merits, Judgment, [1960] ICJ Rep 6, ICGJ 174 (ICJ 1960), 12 
April 1960. 
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In order words, it can be argued that the Award confirms the framework 
defined by Article 125 UNCLOS – which, however, only concerns land-locked 
states - : the access to the sea is a conditional right, the implementation of which 
supposes the agreement of transit states. In this regard, the Award fully confirms 
the necessity to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of Croatia and, more 
generally, of transit states. However, at the same time, it fully innovates the 
issue of access to the sea. After explicitly qualifying the access to and from the 
high seas as a «vital interest», the Award creates an institute – the Junction Area 
– which is functional to implement this interest. Moreover, it is really significant 
to stress that the discipline defined by the Tribunal for this Area goes greatly 
beyond the traditional transit regime. As the analysis of treaties on the freedom 
of transit shows, the content of this freedom is dual: first, it implies the free and 
non-discriminatory transit across the territory of a foreign states (according to 
the concrete modalities defined by agreements between the states concerned), 
and second, it entails the non-submission of traffic in transit to any customs 
duties, taxes or other comparable charges. However, the transit state is fully 
entitled to exercise its prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction on ships, 
vessels, aircraft, vehicles, persons and commodities in transit, with the only 
exceptions defined by the agreement. The regime defined by the Arbitral 
Tribunal is significantly different in this regard insofar as it implies some 
meaningful restrictions on Croatia’s sovereignty, especially in relation to its 
jurisdiction. As already recalled above, some Authors have made reference to the 
controversial notion of international servitude to justify the right of access to the 
sea. Leaving aside the highly debated possibility to admit the existence of 
international servitudes, it is clear that the regime defined by the Tribunal with 
regard to the Junction Area significantly restricts Croatia’s territorial 
sovereignty: by borrowing Clauss’s words and transposing them to this case, the 
Area is «a part of the whole of the territory of one state [which] is made to serve 
the economic needs of another».49  
4. The double nature of the Junction Area: some difficulties resulting from 
its practical implementation 
The reading of the Award’s paragraphs concerning the regime of the Junction 
Area consents to grasp its original and unique nature. In this regard, it is 
possible to make a clear distinction between the original nature of the Area and 
its fictitious nature. From a geographical point of view, this zone is established in 
a body of water which, according to UNCLOS, must be qualified as Croatia’s 
territorial waters. However, due to the necessity to find a balance between 
Croatia’s sovereignty and the effectiveness of freedoms of communication of 
vessels and aircraft going to and coming from Slovenia, the Tribunal created a 
fictitious discipline; this latter regime largely reproduces the typical regulation of 
the EEZ. Indeed, on the one hand, the freedoms characterising the Junction Area 
                                                                 
49 H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law: With Special 
Reference to International Arbitration, London, New York, 1927, 121.  
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include the freedoms of navigation, overflight, and laying submarines cables and 
pipelines; on the other hand, the freedoms of communication do not cover the 
exploitation of biological and mineral resources of the Area, the creation of 
artificial islands, and the carrying out of marine scientific research which are 
typical prerogatives of the coastal states, and indeed, they are left to Croatia.50  
The difference existing between the original and the fictitious nature of the 
Junction Area implies that, at the end of the day, this Area is characterised by a 
“variable geometry regime”: its regulation changes according to the direction of 
ships and aircraft to which it is applied. As for ships and aircraft going to and 
coming from Slovenia, Croatia must assure the implementation of the regime 
defined by the Tribunal for the Area. But, as for all others ships and aircraft, the 
original nature of the Junction Area re-emerges: in other words, it goes back to 
being a body of Croatia’s territorial waters which implies the application of its 
corresponding UNCLOS regulation. The following paragraphs will discuss the 
regime of living marine resources within the Junction Area: this analysis will 
allow to underline the practical difficulties deriving from the double nature 
characterising the regime defined by the Arbitral Tribunal.  
4.1. Management of living marine resources in the Junction Area  
The management of living marine resources in the Junction Area is of utmost 
importance, not only due the obvious role played by fishing activities for 
economic system of all coastal states, but also as fishing is one of the most 
important issues in relation to which the confrontation between Croatia and 
Slovenia has come to light.51 Moreover, the fishing regime is particularly 
interesting as it is paradigmatic of the sui generis nature of the Area and the 
difficulties resulting from its implementation.  
The fishing regime is different depending on the nature of ships to which it 
is applied; in this regard, it is possible to identify two categories of ships:  
 
a) Ships which pass through the Junction Area but do not go nor come from 
Slovenia: these ships will be subject to the regime characterising Croatia’s 
territorial waters. In this regard, according to Article 21 UNCLOS, Croatia 
has sovereign rights as regards living resources in its territorial sea: it may 
exercise its prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction with regard to the 
conservation of living resources of the sea, and the infringement of its 
fisheries laws and regulations.52 Moreover, when ships not going to or 
                                                                 
50 Cf. Croatia v. Slovenia, Final Award, cit., para. 1123: this paragraph reproduces Article 58 
UNCLOS.  
51 Actually, fishing issue between Croatia and Slovenia has come into light in particular as 
regards fishing activities in the disputed Bay of Piran; indeed, according to Slovenia, Croatia 
would have sent its police to guard Croatian fishermen into contested waters of the Bay of 
Piran, violating the EU Common Fisheries Policy: cf. Kait Bolongaro, Slovenia ups stakes in 
Adriatic border dispute A legal tussle with Croatia over the Bay of Piran bodes ill for deeper Balkan 
integration, in Politico, 21 February 2018, available at www.politico.eu/article/slovenia-
croatia-border-piran-ups-stakes-in-adriatic-fishing-dispute/.  
52 Article 21.1(d) and (e), UNCLOS.  
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coming from Slovenia exercise their innocent passage, they must abstain from 
engaging in fishing activities.53 However, in this case, it is necessary to take 
also into account the EU law and in particular the Regulation 1380/2013.54 
The founding principle of the Regulation is the access to waters and resources 
in all Union waters by fishing vessels flying the flag of a EU member state 
(Union fishing vessels).55 However, this principle does not apply to the waters 
up to 12 nautical miles from the baselines under the EU member states 
sovereignty; and so the body of water covered by the Junction Area is 
excluded from the application of this principle. According to the Regulation, 
until 31 December 2022, EU member states may allow fishing activities only 
to fishing vessels that «traditionally fish in those waters from ports on the 
adjacent coast»; however, these restrictions must comply with the provisions 
of Annex I of the Regulation which defines «for each member state the 
geographical zones within the coastal bands of other member states where 
fishing activities are pursued and the species concerned». In order words, 
until 31 December 2022, Croatia may regulate fishing activities in waters 
included in the Junction Area, placing some exceptions on the principle of 
equal access to its Union waters by Union fishing vessels; however, these 
exceptions must comply with Annex I of the Regulation which, indeed, 
recognises some fishing rights to Slovenia.56  
b) Ships passing through the Junction Area and exercising the freedoms of 
communication: the Award is clear in specifying that the freedoms of 
communication do not include the access to living resources. As known, the 
UNCLOS devotes a great deal of attention to the management of living 
resources in the EEZ: the system defined by the Convention is based upon the 
recognition of coastal state’s sovereign rights on living resources. As recalled 
above, this principle, sanctioned by Article 56, para. 1(a), is specified by 
Article 62, para. 1, according to which every coastal state must determine its 
capacity to harvest the living resources in its EEZ and if it is not able to 
harvest the entire allowable catch, it must assure to other states to have 
access to the surplus.57 Although coastal states must guarantee access to other 
states to exceeding living resources, they keep their sovereign rights in this 
regard: indeed, fishing activities in EEZ must be carried out by complying 
                                                                 
53 Article 19.2(i) UNCLOS: the carrying out of fishing activities qualifies the passage as 
offensive.  
54 Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) 
No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) 
No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC. 
55 Ibi, Articles 4-5; this principle does not apply to measures aiming to assure the 
conservation and sustainable exploitation of marine biological resources regulated by Part 
III of the Regulation.  
56 Ibi, Annex I: in Croatia’s coastal waters, and so also in the Junction Area, Slovenian 
vessels are allowed to fish up to 100 tonnes of demersal and small pelagic species for a 
maximum number of 25 fishing vessels, including 5 fishing vessels equipped with trawl nets.  
57 See also Article 61 UNCLOS ruling the conservation and management measures coastal 
states are requested to adopt.  
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with the conservation measures and all terms and conditions defined by the 
coastal state.58  
As, on the one hand, the freedoms of communication do not include the 
exploitation of living resources and, on the other, the Award establishes in the 
Junction Area the typical regime of the EEZ, it is worth asking if the system 
defined by Article 62 UNCLOS finds application in the Area: does Croatia have 
to guarantee to other states access to the surplus of the allowable catch of this 
zone? The reference made by the Award to the «high seas freedoms exercisable 
in an EEZ» is not enough to entail the transposition of EEZ regime as regards 
fishing activities carried out by ships exercising their freedoms of 
communication. Otherwise, the EEZ regime would be only applied to ships 
passing through the Junction Area, which represent an undefined category of 
vessels.  
To conclude, in relation to living resources, the Area established by the 
Arbitral Tribunal keeps its original nature of territorial waters which does not 
allow foreign ships to carry out fishing activities, without prejudice for the 
applicability of the EU Regulation 1380/2013.  
5. The unicum regime characterising the Junction Area  
After underlining the double nature of the Junction Area, it is necessary to look 
into its regime. The analysis of the Award allows to grasp the similarities 
existing between this Area and other institutes of the international law of the 
sea, such as high seas corridors and international straits. The following 
paragraphs will describe these institutes, making a comparison between them 
and the Junction Area.  
5.1. Differences between the Junction Area and high seas corridors  
It is interesting to note that in its Memorial, Slovenia sustained that its right of 
access to and from the high seas could have been assured by establishing a high 
seas corridor in Croatia’s territorial sea: this would consent to respect the rights 
of Croatia. Indeed, according to Slovenia, the 12 nautical miles limit represents 
the maximum extension of territorial sea, which cannot be claimed by a state 
where some «special circumstances» exists. The presence of such circumstances, 
and in particular the vital interest of a state, implies the necessity to limit the 
territorial sea extension of another neighbouring state. This Slovenian assertion 
is supported by referring to some examples provided by international practice; in 
particular, Slovenia recalled the maritime delimitation agreement between 
France and Monaco,59 and the national laws of some states, such as Finland and 
                                                                 
58 Article 62.4 UNCLOS.  
59 Convention on Maritime Delimitation between the Government of His Most Serene 
Highness the Prince of Monaco and the Government of the French Republic, 16 February 
1984, available online at 
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Japan, limiting the extension of their territorial seas.60 These latter examples are 
extremely meaningful as they concern the establishment of some high seas 
corridors. For example, Japanese Law on the Territorial Sea (1977) extends the 
limit of Japan’s territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles; however, the Law 
maintains the limit of 3 nautical miles in five international straits (namely, Soya 
Strait, Osumi Strait, Tsugaru Strait, East and West Tsushima Straits) to assure 
the presence of a high seas corridor in which all vessels and aircraft can enjoy 
their freedoms of navigation and overflight.61 Similarly, South Korea in its 
Territorial Sea Law (1977) defines a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, but in the 
Western Channel of the Korean strait, the Law limits Korean territorial waters 
to 3 miles: this limit, along with the 3 nautical miles stretch of Japanese 
territorial waters in the West Tsushima Strait, allow the existence of a high seas 
corridor in the Korean Strait between Korea and Japan.62  
These high seas corridors fall under the scope of application of Article 36 
UNCLOS, and consequently they are not covered by the regime of international 
straits defined by Part III of the Convention.63 It is worth remarking the double 
difference existing between these corridors and the Junction Area defined by the 
Tribunal in Croatia v. Slovenia case. First, in Japanese and Korean cases, the 
establishment of high seas corridors lies in national laws: the limitation of 
territorial seas’ extension was decided by the states themselves, although in 
some cases these decisions have been motivated by political reasons. Differently, 
the Junction Area was created by an Arbitral Award: while the Tribunal’s 
decision is rooted in will expressed by the parties concerned, it is the result of 
the assessment made by the Tribunal which, as the position expressed by Croatia 
shows, is not fully respondent to the parties’ position. Second, - and certainly this 
is the most relevant difference - the high seas corridors’ regime is not 
comparable to the Area established by the Arbitral Tribunal in the arbitration 
Croatia v. Slovenia: in the cases recalled, the creation of a high seas corridor 
restricts the extension of territorial sea, but it does not affect the sovereignty and 
jurisdiction of coastal states in their territorial waters. Differently, the Junction 
Area does not affect Croatia’s territorial sea from the extent point of view; 
                                                                                                                                                                               
www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/MCO
-FRA1984MD.PDF.  
60 Cf. Croatia v. Slovenia, Final Award, cit., paras. 1057-1058: here, the Award recalls 
paragraphs 10.85-10.86 of Slovenia’s Memorial.  
61 Cf. T. Kuribayashi, The New Ocean Regime and Japan, in 11 Ocean Development and 
International Law 1-2, 1982, 95-124; S. K. Kim, Maritime disputes in northeast Asia: Regional 
Challenges and Cooperation, Leiden, 2017, 46; as underlined by the Author, this decision was 
adopted to assure freedoms of navigation to foreign (and in particular US) nuclear warships; 
indeed, their passage into Japanese territorial waters would have been contrary to the three 
non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction 
of nuclear weapons in Japanese territory.  
62 Cf. C.-H. Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, Seoul, 1983, 144; as reported by the 
Author, the Korean decision rooted in the fear of possible dispute with the Soviet Union 
whose worships used to pass thought the Korean strait going to and coming from 
Vladivostok.  
63 Cf. A. XM Ntovas, Straits used for international navigation in D. Attard, M. Fitzmaurice, N. 
A. Martinez Gutiérrez (eds.), cit., 2014, 79-80.  
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however, the Tribunal establishes in the Area a sui generis regime which 
meaningfully impacts the powers Croatia is entitled to exercise in this zone.  
5.2. Differences between the Junction Area and international straits  
Insofar as the Junction Area aims at making possible an «uninterrupted and 
uninterruptible» link between Slovenia’s territorial sea and the high seas, the 
freedoms of communication seems widely comparable to the transit passage 
characterising the straits used for international navigation. As known, in its Part 
III, the UNCLOS devotes a great deal of attention to straits used for 
international navigation, and it defines different kinds of straits and regimes. 
According to their geomorphological features,64 it is possible to distinguish four 
categories of straits:   
- straits linking two parts of EEZs or high seas: this kind of straits is 
characterised by the transit passage regime (Articles 38-44); 
- straits in which a route through the high seas or EEZ of similar convenience 
exists: they are not ruled by the transit passage regime, but by the other 
relevant Parts of UNCLOS (Article 36);  
- straits between an island and the mainland in which a route through the high 
seas or EEZ of similar convenience exists: these straits are only characterised 
by non-suspendable innocent passage (Articles 45 (a) and 38.1); 
- straits connecting a part of the high seas or an EEZ and the territorial sea of a 
foreign state: like the previous category, also these straits are only 
characterised by non-suspendable innocent passage (Article 45(b).  
Although, strictly speaking, the Junction Area cannot be qualified as an 
international strait, from a geographical point of view, it can be compared to the 
latter kind of strait: indeed, it links Slovenia’s territorial sea with the high seas. 
However, the legal regime defined by the Tribunal makes the Area more 
comparable to straits governed by the transit passage; indeed, this regime has 
the objective to assure the «continuous and expeditious transit of the strait» 
through freedoms of navigation and overflight, and includes the passage 
allowing ships and aircraft to enter, leave, and return from a state bordering the 
strait (Article 38). As affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu 
Channel case, straits are «international highways»65 aiming to guarantee the 
effectiveness of freedoms of navigation and overflight through a body of water. 
These references to international straits consent to grasp the similarities 
existing between the transit regime and freedoms of communication, first of all, 
from a functional point of view. These similarities can also be seen considering 
that these institutes share the same rationale. As underlined by several 
                                                                 
64 The UNCLOS makes also reference to straits which are, in whole or in part, regulated by 
long-standing international conventions specifically concerning these straits; this category 
of straits is ruled by these conventions, and not by UNCLOS (Article 35(c) UNCLOS).  
65 International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania), Judgment, 
Merits, ICJ GL No 1, [1949] ICJ Rep 4, ICGJ 199 (ICJ 1949), 9 April 1949, 29.  
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commentators, the idea of transit passage was proposed by the United Kingdom 
during the Third Law of the Sea Conference, and then formalized by UNCLOS, 
in order to strike a balance between the interests of maritime nations and nations 
bordering straits. The former wanted to preserve their possibility to freely and 
unimpededly pass through international straits and were concerned about any 
restrictions on their freedoms of navigation; the latter were deeply worried about 
the environmental and security threats deriving from the presence of foreign 
ships within straits close to their territorial seas.66 The regime of the Junction 
Area is based upon a similar compromise pursued by the Tribunal in order to 
«guarantee both the integrity of Croatia’s territorial sea and Slovenia’s freedoms 
of communication» (para. 1123).  
The similarities existing between the Area created in Croatia’s territorial 
sea and international straits is implicitly confirmed by the Tribunal itself, when 
it feels the necessity to specify that the freedoms of communication are different 
from the transit passage characterising the regime of international straits under 
UNCLOS. Another explicit reference to straits’ regime is made by the Tribunal 
when it specifies that Croatia keeps jurisdiction upon non-Croatian ships and 
aircraft in the Junction Area «giving effect to the generally accepted 
international standards in accordance with UNCLOS Article 39(2) and (3)» 
(para. 1130), which rules the duties of ships and aircraft during transit passage. 
As already recalled, the Award does not clarify the elements in which the 
freedoms of communication differ from the transit passage. In the light of this 
lack of specifications, it can be useful to make some references to the transit 
passage regime and clarify the differences and similarities existing between this 
regime and the freedoms of communication.  
5.2.1. Freedoms of communications versus transit passage regime  
A general overview of the transit passage regime consents to see that it is 
characterised by some additional freedoms to the regime of innocent passage. 
The differences existing between the regime of transit passage and innocent 
passage concern two main aspects: first, the transit passage also entails the 
freedom of overflight; second, it cannot be subject to any limitations and impeded 
by coastal states. As all these elements characterise the Junction Area, it is 
possible to argue that the freedoms of communication assured in this Area are 
more similar to the transit passage than the innocent passage. Moreover, while 
being a high-debated issue by commentators,67 some scholars argue that, unlike 
                                                                 
66 D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, cit., 240; K. M. Burke, A. DeLeo, Innocent Passage and Transit 
Passage in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in 9 Yale Journal of International 
Law 7, 1983, 399 ff. As for the debate during the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, cf. H. B. Robertson, Passage through International Straits: a Right Preserved in 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 20 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 4, 1980, 819 ff.  
67 R. Lapidoth, International Straits, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
International Law, Vol. IX, Oxford, 2006, 621; H. B. Robertson, cit., 843-4. Lapidoth and 
Robertson argue that the right of transit passage includes the submarines’ right to 
submerged navigation; contra W. M. Reisman, The Regime of International Straits and 
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the regime of innocent passage, the transit regime does not imply the 
submarines’ duty to navigate on the surface. As already recalled, this duty does 
not characterise the Junction Area and so, also in this regard, it is possible to see 
a similarity between this zone and the transit passage.  
According to Article 38, para. 2, UNCLOS the transit passage can be 
defined as the  
«the exercise in accordance with this Part of freedoms of navigation and 
overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of 
the strait». 
In other words, the elements qualifying the transit passage are the 
continuity and expeditiousness of the passage; this implies the inadmissibility of 
any activity not having these characteristics during the exercise of the transit 
passage (Article 39.1(c)), the duty of ships and aircraft to «proceed without 
delay» (Article 39.1(a)), and to abstain from «any activities other than those 
incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless 
rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress» (Article 39.1(c)).68 These 
elements do not apply to the freedoms of communication in the Junction Area 
because they «are exercisable as if they were high seas freedoms exercisable in an 
exclusive economic zone» (para. 1128). This implies that the freedoms of 
communication are wider than freedoms of navigation characterising the transit 
passage: indeed, the freedoms of communication do not only cover freedoms 
which are strictly functional and necessary to have access to Slovenia’s territorial 
sea; they also include all high seas freedoms characterising the EEZ regime. It 
implies that for example, within some limits which will be specified below, ships 
and aircraft exercising the freedoms of communication can carry out military 
activities. 
Continuing with the analysis of the straits regime, as specified by Article 
39, ships and aircraft in transit must refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of states 
bordering straits or violating the principles of international law enshrined in the 
UN Charter (Article 39.1(b). There is no doubt about the applicability of these 
duties to the Junction Area; indeed, they represent some norms of customary 
law69 which certainly prevail on the freedoms of communication.  
The provisions of Article 39, paras. 2 and 3, are extremely important 
because, as specified by the Award, Croatia keeps the right to adopt laws and 
regulations to implement the «generally accepted international standards in 
accordance with UNCLOS Article 39(2) and (3)» (para. 1130). According to 
Article 39, para. 2 (a), ships in transit must comply with «generally accepted 
                                                                                                                                                                               
National Security: an Appraisal of International Lawmaking, in 74 American Journal of 
International Law 48, 1980, 71; cf. K. M. Burke, A. DeLeo, cit., 403-4.  
68 With specific regard to the notion of «normal modes of continuous and expeditious 
transit», cf. A. XM Ntovas, cit., 85-86.  
69 Cf. T. Scovazzi, Management regimes and responsibility for international straits. With special 
reference to the Mediterranean Straits, in 19 Marine Policy 2, 1995, 140.  
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international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea». While 
UNCLOS only explicitly recalls the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea70, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) interprets 
the expression «generally accepted international regulations, procedures and 
practices» in a broader way, including also non-binding instruments71  and the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.72 Article 39, para. 2 (a), 
must be read in conjunction with Article 41 allowing bordering states to define 
sea lanes and traffic separation schemes for navigation in straits in order to 
promote navigation safety. The prescription of these routes must comply with 
generally accepted international regulations,73 and bordering states must involve 
the IMO in the adoption process.74 As Article 41 concerns the implementation of 
generally accepted international standards of navigation security ruled by 
Article 39, para. 2(a), and this latter provision is recalled by the Award, it can be 
argued that Croatia may prescribe sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in the 
Junction Area, in conformity with Article 41.  
As regards Article 39, para. 2 (b), it stipulates that ships in transit must 
comply with «generally accepted international regulations, procedures and 
practices for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships». This 
expression makes reference to the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships,75 and the International Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.76 Finally, as 
prescribed by Article 39, para. 3, aircraft overflying international straits must 
observe the Rules of the Air defined by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, and the other measures assuring the security of navigation.77   
                                                                 
70 The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) were adopted 
by IMO in 1972.  
71 Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization, Implications of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, 30 January 2014, 
LEG/MISC.8, 18. As regards the notion of generally accepted international regulations 
recalled by UNCLOS, see also M. Fornari, Il regime giuridico degli stretti utilizzati per la 
navigazione internazionale, Milano, 2010, 134. 
72 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was adopted by IMO 
in 1974.  
73 As specified by IMO, the generally accepted international regulations include the SOLAS 
and COLREGs Conventions, and the IMO General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing (IMO 
Resolution A.572(14), 1985); see Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization, cit., 
32-33.  
74 See in particular Article 41.4 UNCLOS: «Before designating or substituting sea lanes or 
prescribing or substituting traffic separation schemes, states bordering straits shall refer 
proposals to the competent international organization with a view to their adoption. The 
organization may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be agreed 
with the states bordering the straits, after which the states may designate, prescribe or 
substitute them».  
75 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was 
adopted by IMO in 1973.  
76 The International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter was adopted by IMO in 1972.  
77 Article 39.3 UNCLOS: «Aircraft in transit passage shall: (a) observe the Rules of the Air 
established by the International Civil Aviation Organization as they apply to civil aircraft; 
state aircraft will normally comply with such safety measures and will at all times operate 
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Article 42, para. 1, UNCLOS enables coastal states to regulate (a) the 
safety of navigation and regulation of maritime traffic, (b) the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution to implement international regulations on the 
discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait (c), fishing 
activities, and (d) the loading and unloading of commodities, currencies and 
persons in violation of their customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws and 
regulations. It is worth considering whether and to what extent Croatia is 
entitled to exercise its jurisdiction in the Junction Area as regards the fields 
covered by Article 42; indeed, the necessity to find a balance between freedoms of 
navigation through straits and interests of coastal states to regulate some issues 
impacting their national interests, does not only underlie Article 4278, but finds a 
match in the competing interests of Slovenia and Croatia in the zone established 
by the Arbitral Tribunal. It is reasonable to suppose that Croatia is empowered 
to enact laws and regulations concerning the safety of navigation (article 41.1(a)) 
and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution (41.1(b)); indeed, these 
areas correspond to those covered by Article 39(2) and (3) UNCLOS, in relation 
to which, according to paragraph 1130 of the Award, Croatia keeps its 
jurisdiction. However, as for safety of navigation and pollution issues, the 
prescriptive jurisdiction of coastal state (rectius of Croatia) cannot be unilaterally 
exercised but must comply with generally accepted international regulations.  
The Award is clear in not empowering Croatia to rule as regards other 
areas. On account of this, it must be excluded that Croatia can exercise its 
jurisdiction with regard to loading and unloading of commodities, currencies and 
persons (Article 42.1(d)); this exclusion can be justified as, unlike the other areas, 
the prescriptive jurisdiction of coastal states (rectius of Croatia) in this regard 
does not find a limit in international standards.79  
5.3. A comparison between the Junction Area and international straits as 
regards some “sensitive” issues 
The following paragraphs will aim at analysing the regime of the Junction Area 
in relation to some issues, such as the control of foreign military activities and 
the protection of marine environment, which can really concern coastal states. In 
this regard, the question arises as how to find a fair balance between the exercise 
of coastal states’ jurisdiction and freedoms of navigation of third states. A 
comparison between the Junction Area discipline and the regime of international 
straits will be useful to point out the different solutions adopted to strike a right 
balance between the competing interests at stake.  
5.3.1. Legitimacy and control of foreign military activities in the Junction Area 
                                                                                                                                                                               
with due regard for the safety of navigation; (b) at all times monitor the radio frequency 
assigned by the competent internationally designated air traffic control authority or the 
appropriate international distress radio frequency».  
78 In this regard, cf. A. XM Ntovas, cit., 90 ff.  
79 The only limit defined by Article 42 is represented by the principle of non-discrimination 
among foreign ships.  
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It is worth making some references to the admissibility of military activities in 
the Junction Area. In spite of the practical feasibility of this kind of activities in 
this zone, and more generally in the Mediterranean Sea,80 the question can 
acquire some importance because, unlike the innocent passage, the freedoms of 
communication cannot be suspended under any circumstances and are 
recognised regardless their innocent nature. Clearly, these elements can 
significantly impact on Croatia’s national security as, under the normal regime of 
innocent passage, the suspension power recognised to coastal state for essential 
security reasons (Article 25.3), and the innocent condition of passage play a 
crucial role in allowing coastal state to assure security within its territorial sea.  
With regard to the admissibility of military manoeuvres, it is necessary to 
take into account that as specified by the Award, the freedoms of communication 
cover the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and «other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms», and certainly this reference can 
include the carrying out of some (and legitimate) military activities. The 
admissibility of military activities undertaken by warships and aircraft in the 
EEZs of other states is highly debated, especially in the light of recent practice of 
some states.81 However, most of the Authors argue that, without prejudice of 
customary rule prohibiting the threat or the use of force, the military activities in 
foreign EEZs are legitimate, and do not need to be previously notified and 
authorised by the coastal state.82   
                                                                 
80 In this sense, cf. G. D’Agosto, Attività militari e zona economica esclusiva, in U. Leanza, L. 
Sico, Zona economica esclusiva e Mare Mediterraneo, Napoli, 1989, 89 ff.  
81 In this regard, it is worth recalling the incidents occurred between China and USA in 
South China Sea: China argued that foreign vessels and aircraft are not allowed to carry out 
military operations within Chinese EEZ without the prior authorisation of Chinese 
Government; cf., inter alia, R. P. Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The 
Right to Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, in 9 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 1, 2010, 9-29; H. Zhang, Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or 
Maritime Hegemony of the United States? Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo’s Article on Military 
Activities in the EEZ, in 9 Chinese Journal of International Law 1, 2010, 31-47; J. M. van Dyke, 
Balancing Navigational Freedom with Environmental and Security Concerns, in 15 Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 19, 2003, 19-28; Id., Military Ships and 
Planes Operating in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Another Country, in 28 Marine Policy 1, 2004, 
29-39; see also S. B. Kaye, Freedom of navigation in a post 9/11 world: security and creeping 
jurisdiction, in D. Freestone, R. Barnes, D. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea Progress and 
Prospects, Oxford, 2006, 347-364.  
82 See, inter alia, R. P. Pedrozo, cit.; J. M. van Dyke, Balancing Navigational Freedom with 
Environmental and Security Concerns, cit.; U. Leanza, M. C. Caracciolo, The Exclusive Economic 
Zone, in D. Attard, M. Fitzmaurice, N. A. Martinez Gutiérrez (eds.), cit., 192 ff.; G. D’Agosto, 
cit., 67 ff.; B.A. Hamzah, Unauthorised Manoeuvres in Waters: US Chides M’sia Restrictions, in 
RSIS Commentary, 9 May 2017, available at www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/CO17088.pdf; G. V. Galdorisi, A. G. Kaufman, Military Activities 
in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict, in 32 California 
Western International Law 2, 2001-2002, 253-301; J. Geng, The Legality of Foreign Military 
Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS, in 28 Utrecht Journal of International 
and European Law 74, 2012, 22-30, available at doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.ax; M. Hayashi, 
Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Foreign Coastal States in D. Freestone 
(ed.), The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention At 30: Successes, Challenges and New Agendas, Leiden, 
Boston, 2013, 121-129. 
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In this regard, it is worth recalling that the freedoms of communication are 
not suspendable by Croatia «under any circumstances», and more generally, 
cannot be subject to «any controls or requirements» beyond those established by 
UNCLOS in the EEZ. This specification is of utmost importance as it 
categorically excludes any possibilities to limit the number of foreign warships 
exercising their freedoms in the Junction Area and to ask them a prior 
notification of their passage. It is necessary to take into account that Croatia has 
placed some limitations on innocent passage of warship in its territorial sea.83 
Indeed, when Croatia decided to be considered a party to the UNCLOS, 
succeeding to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it declared that no 
peremptory norm of general international law prevents coastal states from 
limiting the number of foreign warships entitled to contemporaneously exercise 
their innocent passage, and from consenting their passage upon a previous 
notification.84 Indeed, the Croatian Maritime Code stipulates that no later 24 
hours before the passage of a foreign warship, its flag state must inform Croatian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs about its intention of innocent passage;85 moreover, 
according to the Code, navigation in Croatian territorial sea is not allowed to 
more than three foreign warships having same nationality, except in cases of 
special permission granted by the Minister of Defence.86 This background allows 
to grasp the meaningfulness of the specification made by the Tribunal according 
to which the freedoms of communication in the Junction Area  
«are not subject to […] any coastal state controls or requirements other 
than those permitted under the legal regime of the EEZ established by 
UNCLOS» (para. 1127).  
This clarification makes clear that, in the Area established by the Arbitral 
Tribunal, Croatia is not entitled to apply the limitations defined by its Maritime 
Code as regards the exercise of innocent passage by warships.    
Another different, albeit connected, problem arises as whether and to what 
extent Croatia keeps power to control and limit freedoms of navigation for 
security reasons in the Junction Area. In the last few years, the necessity to 
                                                                 
83 As regards the debate on the admissibility of these limitations, cf. W. K. Agyebeng, Theory 
in Search of Practice: The Right of Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea, in 39 Cornell 
International Law Journal 2, 2006, 371-399, see in particular 391 ff.; D.G. Stephens, The 
Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime Naval/Military 
Operations, in 29 California Western International Law Journal, 1998, 283-311, see in particular 
305 ff.; D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, cit., 268 ff.  
84 United Nations Treaty Collection, United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Declaration of Croatia: «The Republic of Croatia considers that, in accordance with article 
53 the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 29 May 1969, there is no peremptory 
norm of general international law, which would forbid a coastal state to request by its laws 
and regulations foreign warships to notify their intention of innocent passage through its 
territorial waters, and to limit the number of warships allowed to exercise the right of 
innocent passage at the same time (Articles 17-32 of the Convention)».  
85 Croatian Maritime Code, 8 December 2004, available at 
www.csamarenostrum.hr/userfiles/files/Nacion%20zakon%20engl/MARITIME%20CODE
.pdf, Article 22.  
86 Ibi, Article 26.  
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assure maritime security against weapon trafficking and terrorist attacks has 
acquired a new relevance in the international scene: this scenario has led to 
several initiatives put in place by some states to exercise jurisdiction in their 
EEZs.87 As these initiatives affect the freedom to carry out military activities in 
EEZ, their admissibility has been highly debated by commentators. It is worth 
retracing the framework defined by UNCLOS in this regard. First, Article 56, 
para. 1, grants to coastal states «sovereign rights» in their EEZs as regards the 
exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of natural resources, 
both living and non-living, and with regard to other activities of economic 
exploitation and exploration, such as the production of energy. Second, 
according to Article 56, para. 2, coastal states are entitled to exercise their 
jurisdiction in respect of artificial islands, installations and similar structures, 
marine scientific research, and protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.88 Third, Article 73 UNCLOS clearly defines the scope of 
application of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction recognised to coastal 
                                                                 
87 See for example the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced in May 2003 by US 
President George W. Bush, as a means to fight against proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction; this initiative was formalised in PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles 
adopted in September 2003, and then endorsed by 105 nations around the world (cf. US 
Department of State, Statement of Interdiction Principles, 4 September 2003, available at 
www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm). This initiative implies naval operations to search and 
stop vessels suspected of carrying nuclear materials; see in particular US Department of 
State, Statement of Interdiction Principles, cit., principle 4(d): PSI participants are 
committed «To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, 
territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to 
seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or 
leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and 
seizure of such cargoes prior to entry». As regards the PSI and its interplay with freedoms 
of navigation, cf. among others Y.-H. Song, The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and 
UNCLOS: Legality, Implementation, and an Assessment, in 38 Ocean Development and 
International Law 1-2, 2007, 101-145; M. Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation 
Security Initiative, in 98 The American Journal of International Law 3, 2004, 526-545; A. 
Dunne, The Proliferation Security Initiative. Legal Considerations and Operational Realities, 
SIPRI, Policy Paper, Solna, May 2013, available at 
www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP36.pdf; D. Guilfoyle, The Proliferation 
Security Initiative: Interdicting Vessels in International Waters to Prevent the Spread of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction?, in 29 Melbourne University Law Review 3, 2005, 733-764, available at 
law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/1707982/29_3_4.pdf. In 2004, Australia 
announced its wish to create a Maritime Identification Zone, extending 1000 nautical miles 
from Autralian coastline: in order to improve the maritime security, all vessels intending to 
enter Australian ports, would be required to provide some comprehensive information, such 
as their identity, crew, location, speed and intended port of arrival; cf. Australian 
Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Strengthening Offshore 
Maritime Security, Media Release, 15 December 2004, available at 
pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-21554. For a comment see, inter alia, N. Klein, 
Legal Implications of Australia’s Maritime Identification System, in 55 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 2, 2006, 337-368.  
88 These three fields are further ruled by other UNCLOS provisions: see Article 60 on 
artificial islands, installations and similar structures; Article 246 on marine scientific 
research; and Articles 208-210-211-220 on pollution. 
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states’ in their EEZs, restricting it to exploration, exploitation, conservation and 
management of living resources. In the light of this, there is no doubts about the 
economic vocation characterising the EEZ and underlying the jurisdiction 
granted to coastal states in this zone. Against this background, as underlined by 
some Authors, the control of military activities in EEZ is admissible insofar as it 
concerns fields in relation to which the UNCLOS grants jurisdiction to coastal 
states.89  
Finally, it is necessary to take into account Article 59 dealing with cases in 
which coastal states and other states have competing interests in an EEZ. The 
provision identifies the basis for resolution in equity and all relevant 
circumstances, and in particular «the respective importance of the interests 
involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole». 
While being really vague, the open formulation90 of this provision consents to 
elaborate an evolutionary interpretation about the jurisdiction coastal states are 
entitled to exercise in their EEZ.91 In the light of this, as authoritatively argued 
by a commentator, coastal states’ claim to extend their jurisdiction within the 
EEZs for security reasons must be assessed taking also into account that fight 
against terrorism and pursuing of maritime security can be qualified as interests 
of international community as a whole.92 Without underestimating the 
developing role which can be played by Article 59 UNCLOS, and without 
definitely excluding the possibility to recognise a broader jurisdiction to coastal 
states, at the moment, it seems difficult to recognise the legitimacy of security 
powers claimed by coastal states in their EEZs. Indeed, these powers appear 
more functional to assure national security and military interests of coastal states 
than the international fight against terrorism.  
Turning now to consider the specific case of Croatia’s jurisdiction in the 
Junction Area, it is necessary to recall the distinction, identified by the Tribunal, 
between the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of Croatia in this zone. As 
already recalled, Croatia keeps the right to adopt laws and regulations to 
implement the «generally accepted international standards in accordance with 
UNCLOS Article 39(2) and (3)». These provisions make reference to rules 
aiming to assure the navigation safety and the control and reduction of pollution. 
                                                                 
89 Cf. N. Klein, cit., see in particular 356: «The enforcement of law relating to the protection 
of the offshore maritime security of a coastal state stands on less sure footing». See also R. P. 
Pedrozo, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: East Asia Focus, in 90 International 
Law Studies 514, 2014, 514-543: the functional nature of the EEZ emerges as a criterion to 
identify admissible limitations adopted by coastal states on military activities carried out in 
their EEZ at 524 ff.  
90 As regards this provision and its open formulation, cf. among others, Center for Oceans 
Law and Policy, University of Virginia, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, vol. 
2, Leiden, Boston, 2013, 569; D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, cit., 87.  
91 In this sense, cf. N. Klein, cit., 360: as underlined by the Author, «the Convention has 
anticipated that the needs of the various actors in the international system may vary over 
time».  
92 Ibi, 359-360; in the same sense, D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, cit., 96.  
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Although the notion of navigation safety is not specified by Article 39, it seems 
possible to adopt a broad interpretation, including the maritime security.93  
As for the enforcement jurisdiction, the Award is clear in specifying that 
Croatia has the right to take enforcement actions only outside the Junction Area. 
So, quid iuris about Croatian enforcement actions in respect of its laws and 
regulations aiming to assure maritime security in the Junction Area: are these 
actions absolutely inadmissible or might they be admitted in some exceptional 
circumstances? Certainly, the enforcement actions in the Area are explicitly 
excluded by the Award to assure the freedoms of communication. Moreover, the 
EEZ regime artificially established does not consent to admit any exception 
because, as recalled above, the jurisdiction of coastal states must be completely 
excluded in relation to military activities carried out in EEZ by foreign states. 
So, a literal and restrictive interpretation of the Award would lead to exclude the 
admissibility of Croatian enforcement actions in relation to military activities 
carried out in the Junction Area.  
However, a more respectful interpretation of Croatia’s sovereignty might 
be adopted taking into account that, as specified by the Award, the regime 
established must be fulfilled in «good faith and in a reasonable manner» (para. 
1133). In this regard, it is necessary to recall some meaningful elements. First, 
the difference between the original nature of the Junction Area and its fictitious 
nature: this zone is a body of Croatia’s territorial sea in which the Tribunal has 
introduced the typical regime of an EEZ. Second, although – as underlined by 
the Tribunal – this zone is small, and Croatia keeps its enforcement jurisdiction 
outside of this Area, it is also true that the body of territorial sea dividing the 
Junction Area and Croatian territory is extremely narrow, especially at the 
North-east end. Third, the freedoms of communication cannot be suspended 
under any circumstances and are recognised regardless their innocent nature. In 
the light of the above, a “reasonable” interpretation of the Award might lead to 
retain that Croatia keeps the right to intervene in the Junction Area for security 
reasons in two exceptional circumstances. First, when ships or aircraft exercise 
their freedoms of communication in the Area in a manner amounting to a use or 
a threat of force: this attitude would not only be contrary to the principle of the 
use of high seas for peaceful purposes (Article 88 UNCLOS), but would also 
violate the customary norm prohibiting the use or threat of force. Second, when 
ships or aircraft exercise their freedoms in a manner which, while not amounting 
to a use or threat of force, poses a serious threat to maritime security: in these 
cases, Croatia’s enforcement actions can be exceptionally admitted also in the 
Junction Area, when the implementation of enforcement measures outside the 
Area would not be enough to successfully contain the threat. It must be 
recognised that this interpretation, while based upon the good faith and 
reasonableness criteria recalled by the Award, risks to be too stretched and it 
might arise several objections. The case of military activities exemplifies that the 
                                                                 
93 In this regard, see the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea which, after 
the amendment introduced in 2002, rules some «Special measures to enhance maritime 
safety» (Chapter XI).  
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EEZ regime, characterising the Junction Area, is not always able to find a fair 
balance between the competing interests at stake; indeed, a broad (and stretched) 
interpretation of the Award represents the only chance to reach a really fair 
solution.  
In this regard, it can be useful to recall the regulation of international 
straits under UNCLOS, and point out the difference from the regime created by 
the Arbitral Tribunal. Clarifying that «all ships» are entitled to exercise the 
transit passage (Article 38.1), the Convention does not leave any doubt about the 
warships’ right to transit through international straits. Like other vessels, 
warships are requested to comply with duties defined by Article 39, and in 
particular with the duty to abstain from any threat or use of force against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of states bordering the 
strait, and to «refrain from any activities other than those incident to their 
normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary 
by force majeure or by distress». A question can arise as how to specifically define 
the “normal mode” characterising the transit of warships; however, without a 
shadow of doubt, the carrying out of military manoeuvres cannot be qualified as 
a normal mode of transit, and so it is not allowed in international straits.94  
5.3.2. Protection of marine environment in the Junction Area 
Another “sensitive” issue in relation to which the balance between the freedoms 
of navigation and interests of bordering states can arise some questions, is the 
protection of marine environment and in particular the extent of jurisdiction 
bordering states are entitled to exercise in this regard.  
A coastal state keeps jurisdiction with regard to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment in its EEZ (Article 56.1.b(iii) UNCLOS); 
and foreign states exercising their rights in the EEZ must comply with the laws 
and regulations adopted by the coastal state (Article 58.3). These provisions are 
completed by the enforcement side of jurisdiction: indeed, according to Article 
73, the exercise of coastal states’ sovereignty in their EEZs entails that they have 
the right to take all necessary measures - including boarding, inspection, arrest 
and judicial proceedings - to enforce laws and regulations ruling the EEZ.95 
However, as regards the protection of marine environment in the Junction Area, 
the Award excludes the application of the EEZ regime. Indeed, as specified by 
the Award, in this Area Croatia keeps its prescriptive jurisdiction to implement 
the generally accepted international standards in the field of navigation safety 
and prevention, reduction and control of pollution; at the same time, the Award 
does not recognise any enforcement power to Croatia, even in relation to marine 
environment. Against this background, a literal interpretation of the Arbitral 
decision leads to conclude that Croatia does not have any right to enforce its 
environmental protection law in the Junction Area. Like for the control of 
military activities, one might sustain the possibility to adopt a less restrictive 
interpretation, based upon good faith and reasonable criteria. This interpretation 
                                                                 
94 In this sense, D. R. Rothwell and T. Stephens, cit., 272-273.  
95 The enforcement powers of coastal states are further detailed by Article 220 UNCLOS.  
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might lead to admit that, given the importance recognised by international law 
to environmental protection, Croatia can take enforcement actions towards 
vessels violating generally accepted international standards in some exceptional 
cases, and in particular when the violation poses a serious threat to maritime 
environment, and the exercise of enforcement actions outside the Junction Area 
would not be enough to assure an effective protection.  
At the same time, it is worth analysing the regime of international straits 
defined by UNCLOS. The enforcement powers of bordering states are not 
explicitly ruled by the Convention; on this account, as underlined by some 
commentators, the question remains whether or not coastal states are entitled to 
enforce laws and regulations adopted under Article 42.96 Nevertheless, the 
environmental protection is the only area in relation to which UNCLOS 
explicitly recognises the enforcement jurisdiction of bordering states: it is 
significant in this regard Article 233 included in Part XII on the protection of 
marine environment. According to this provision, merchant vessels in transit 
which, following a violation of laws and regulations adopted by bordering states 
to assure navigation safety and prevent, reduce and control pollution, cause or 
threat «major damage to the marine environment of the straits», may be subject 
to «appropriate enforcement measures» by bordering states. The protection of 
marine environment is of such importance that bordering states are -explicitly- 
allowed to exercise their enforcement jurisdiction in relation to this field; 
however, the enforcement actions are limited to cases where a major damage to 
the marine environment has been realized or threatened.  
Also as regards this issue, the regime of international straits proves to be 
able to balance the competing interests at stake. On the one hand, the bordering 
states’ interests to protect their marine environment is secured by recognising 
them the right to enforce their environmental laws; and, as underlined by some 
commentators, the enforcement measures can also include the stopping of 
transit.97 On the other hand, freedoms of navigations of other states are assured 
by limiting the enforcement actions of coastal states to only cases in which a 
major damage to environment has been realized or threatened.  
6. Concluding remarks 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is possible to affirm that the Junction Area 
regime, on the one hand, combines different elements typical of the EEZ regime 
and of straits used for international navigation; on the other, this regime is 
characterised by some specific features. In particular, these three components can 
be traced in the following way. First, the interplay between the exploitation of 
maritime resources and freedoms of navigation is regulated by adopting the EEZ 
regime. Second, the prescriptive jurisdiction is defined by applying a modified 
version of straits regime: indeed, unlike states bordering straits, Croatia cannot 
                                                                 
96 As for this lack of clarity, cf. D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, cit., 243; R. Lapidoth, cit., 621.  
97 In this sense, cf. B.B. Jia, The Regime of Straits in International Law, New York, 1998, 154; 
D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, cit., 243.  
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enact laws and regulations in relation to the loading and unloading of 
commodities, currencies and persons in the Area established by the Tribunal. 
Third, according to a restrictive and literal interpretation of the Award, Croatia’s 
enforcement jurisdiction must be completely excluded in this zone; and this 
certainly represents quite a unicum within the international law of the sea.98 In 
conclusion, the Junction Area is characterised by a sui generis nature the main 
element of which is the EEZ regime: indeed, the criterion defining the extent of 
the freedoms of navigation in the Area is represented by «high seas freedoms 
exercisable in an exclusive economic zone» (para. 1128). 
As regards the specific nature of the freedoms of communication, as 
described by the Award, they seem to become more and more wide, and 
consequently they imply increasing restrictions on Croatia’s sovereignty. The 
analysis of paragraphs 1123-1128 of the Award shows that some elements of 
these freedoms, namely the freedoms of navigation, overflight and laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines (para. 1123), and their non-suspendability, are 
reasonably necessary to assure their substance and effectiveness. Moreover, the 
Tribunal is able to fairly weigh the competing interests at stake when it specifies 
that the freedoms of communication do not entail the freedom to exploit, 
conserve and manage biological and mineral resources, the right to establish and 
use artificial islands and installations, the right to carry out marine scientific 
research, and the right to take measures for the protection or preservation of the 
marine environment (para. 1126). Thereafter, when the Tribunal does not 
impose the innocence nature of the passage and the submarines’ duty to navigate 
on the surface, the balance starts to weigh in favour of Slovenian position: 
indeed, while these two aspects make the exercise of the freedoms of 
communication easier and more feasible, their non-provision would not have 
compromised their essence; on the contrary, it would have been more respectful 
of Croatia’s sovereignty in its territorial waters. The balance of interests at stake 
ends up being definitely resolved in favour of Slovenia when the freedoms of 
communication are compared to the «high sea freedoms exercisable in an EEZ» 
(para. 1127-8); and consequently, the EEZ regime becomes the main element 
characterising this sui generis Junction Area.  
Insofar as this Area is, to a large extent, assimilated to an EEZ, its regime 
must be defined by applying the UNCLOS provisions regulating this zone. This 
mechanism implies that the Junction Area is characterised by a discipline which 
aims at assuring the freedoms of navigation and consequently, entails some 
meaningful limitations on the sovereignty of coastal state. The point is that this 
kind of regime is “artificially” transposed by the Tribunal in an area placed 
within 12 nautical miles from Croatia’s costs and which, from a natural point of 
view, is part of its territorial sea. The necessity to assure Slovenia’s access to and 
                                                                 
98 As recalled by the Arbitral Tribunal, a similar regime can be found in the Treaty on the 
Redemption of the Sound Dues between Denmark and Sweden, signed at Copenhagen on 14 
March 1857; according to Article 1 of the Treaty: «Aucun navire quelconque ne pourra 
désormais, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, être assujetti, au passage du Sund ou des Belt, à 
une détention ou entrave quelconque». As regards the Danish straist see, among others, B.B. 
Jia, cit., 115 ff.; M. Fornari, cit., 292 ff. 
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from the high seas leads the Tribunal to apply in the Junction Area the regime of 
a zone, such as the EEZ, which was created to balance the economical 
exploitation of maritime resources and freedoms of high seas; instead, the 
Tribunal excludes to adopt the transit passage regime, which was created to 
assure «an international highway» between two different maritime areas. As 
already recalled, the Junction Area and transit passage in international straits 
share a similar rationale: they aim at assuring the freedoms of navigation in a 
narrow body of the sea and guaranteeing the sovereignty of states bordering the 
sea area in question. At the same time, the transit passage and the Area created 
by the Arbitral Tribunal are characterised by some differences; they mainly 
concern three aspects: the prescriptive jurisdiction, the enforcement jurisdiction, 
and the freedoms of navigation/freedoms of communication.  
As for international straits, bordering states can exercise their prescriptive 
jurisdiction in relation to some areas (fishing activities; navigation security; 
loading and unloading of commodities, currencies and persons; and 
environmental protection) by implementing generally accepted standards, and 
not by applying more restrictive regulations in a unilateral manner; their 
enforcement actions are excluded with the great exception of violations causing 
or threatening a major damage to marine environment. As for the Junction Area, 
the prescriptive jurisdiction is similar to that recognised to states bordering 
international straits, although with exceptions in some meaningful areas, such as 
loading and unloading of commodities, currencies and persons; and the 
enforcement jurisdiction is completely excluded.  
With regard to the freedoms of navigation through straits and freedoms of 
communication in the Junction Area, they share their non-suspendable nature; 
indeed, freedoms of navigation are guaranteed by securing a transit which 
cannot be suspended nor impaired; similarly, the freedoms of communication 
cannot be suspended «under any circumstances» and cannot be subject to «any 
controls or requirements». Besides this significant similarity, their main 
difference lies in the content characterising these freedoms: the transit through 
straits must be «continuous and expeditious». Instead, the freedoms of 
communication «are exercisable as if they were high seas freedoms exercisable in 
an exclusive economic zone».  
This focus on the differences between the regime of international straits 
and the Junction Area, and in particular on the different extent of freedoms of 
navigation and freedoms of communication, allows to grasp the contradiction 
affecting these latter institute. As underlined above, freedoms of communication 
are assured «for the purposes of uninterrupted and uninterruptible access to and 
from Slovenia», and seems to be characterised by a strong functional vocation. 
Nevertheless, since the high seas freedoms exercisable in an EEZ become the 
parameter to define the extent of freedoms in the Junction Area, this Area misses 
the original aim underlying its creation. The military activities are paradigmatic 
in this regard. As the analysis showed, the content of freedoms of navigation 
characterising the EEZ is much wider than freedoms of communication, and 
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goes significantly beyond what would be strictly necessary to assure an 
«uninterrupted and uninterruptible access to and from Slovenia».  
More generally, the analysis made on military activities and on protection 
of marine environment proves that a fair balance between the interests at stake 
in the Junction Area can only be reached by applying some good faith and 
reasonable criteria which, however, risk to lead towards a too stretched and 
questionable interpretation. Instead, in the light of the same rationale 
characterising the transit passage and the Junction Area, the application of 
international straits regime, along with some corrective elements, would have 
made it possible to find a fairer balance of the competing interests involved. On 
the one hand, it would have created an “international highway” joining Slovenia 
with the high seas; at the same time, the continuity and expeditiousness of the 
transit would have allowed the only passages strictly functional to the exercise 
of the freedoms of communication, without widening it beyond what is 
necessary. On the other hand, transit passage regime would have prevented 
Croatia from limiting communications beyond what is necessary to assure the 
navigation security and protection of environment.  
In spite of these shortcomings, it cannot be denied the pioneering character 
of the Award adopted in the case Croatia v. Slovenia. The creation of a Junction 
Area between Slovenia’s territorial sea and the high seas represents a crucial 
innovation within the regime of states, such as geographically disadvantaged 
states, having a limited access to the high seas, and it might have some 
meaningful consequences in their future discipline. The establishment of the 
Junction Area is based upon the recognition that the right of access to and from 
the sea can be qualified as a “vital interest” of a state. This interest is so vital that 
its implementation legitimates some meaningful restrictions on the sovereignty 
and jurisdiction of its neighbouring state(s). As underlined above, the reasoning 
of the Tribunal confirms that the access to the sea has not acquired (yet) the 
status of a principle of customary law, and in this regard, it does not innovate the 
status of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states under 
international law of the sea. Yet, the crucial importance recognised to the access 
to the high seas – along with the consequent restrictions placed on Croatia’s 
sovereignty – constitutes an important precedent and might be recalled in the 
future by land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states to strengthen 
their claims.  
 
